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The Value of Reading Fiction
Gerald P. Gleeson
Questions about the value and point of engaging with works of art,
literature and music, become more pressing once the fictional
character of aesthetic experience is acknowledged. In reading novels,
for example, we entertain thoughts we know to be untrue, or whose
actual truth is, at least, of no concern to us. We engage with these
works, we respond to them in numerous ways: we come to pity
their heroines, to be excited by the drama, angered at the injustice
or moved by the sufferings they portray. Of what value is this
engagement with the fictional? Is it, as Colin Radford has argued,
fundamentalIy 'irrational'? Radford notes that there are adults
'who cannot be engaged by what happens in works of fiction', by
what is not true, and who presumably miss out on what for others is
an irreplaceable pleasure; but, he says, their 'logic is impeccable'. 1
In this article I will seek to show that while aesthetic experience
involves a kind of self-deception, it typically does so in a non-
deceptive way. I will defend the value of aesthetic fiction by showing
how it helps reconcile us to a kind of self-deception that is
ineliminable from our lives.
Before developing my account, it may help to note in passing
some other ways in which other philosophers might evaluate
aesthetic experience. An empiricist may be content to observe that
reading a novel is valued for the (sensible) pleasure it brings. A
rationalist might value fictional works as imaginative representations
of intelIectual and moral truths. A Kantian will locate the value of
aesthetic beauty in the way it symbolizes morality. Yet other accounts
are indebted to contemporary philosophies orIanguage. Paul Ricoeur,
for example, claims that works of tiction generate new semantic
meanings and provide access to new realms of reality: the world of
the text. Ricoeur writes that fictional and poetic discourse 'brings to
language a pre-objective world in which we find ourselves already
rooted'; by 'pre-objective' he means prior to our conventional
classitications and scientific formulations. He values poetic
Colin Radford, 'Replies to 'lbree Critics', Philosophy 64 (19119): 96-7. Cf. his
'How can we he moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?', PASS 44 (1975):
67-93
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fictionalization for its capacity to 're-describe' reality.2
I will not delay to assess these various proposals; irrespective
of their distinctive merits, they fail to capture a crucial feature of
aesthetic and personal experience. This feature, which I will term
'significance', becomes most evident from a consideration of the way
meaning is experienced in personal. cultural, religious and aesthetic
contexts. Beginning with an informal characterisation of the
experience of significant meaning, I will seek to show how it helps to
illuminate both metaphorical speech and the value of engaging with
works of fiction.
Significant Meaning
Every meaningful phenomenon (whether linguistic or non-linguistic)
exemplifies a panern or structurc whose repetition can be perceptually
recognized, and in being rccognized directs us to 'something' beyond
itself, and beyond that ficld of differentiation against which it stands
out. Ritual gestures, facial exprcssions, works of art, and cultural and
aesthetic cxpericnces more widely, just like the sentences of a
language. all involve 'meaning' in this sense.
This broad characterisation of the meaningful docs not, of course,
cxplain all that needs to be said about meaning in general or linguistic
communication in particular. Language-unlikc ritual action or facial
expression-has a rccursive compositional structure which makes it
amenable to semantic analysis; semantic structure ensures that
individual uttcranccs havc a dcterminant sense relative to the system
of language as a whole. and in virtue of which utteranccs can have
propositional content. A theory of linguistic meaning can thus refine
the notion of an utterance 'directing us beyond itself: an utterance
directs us to 'what it says', to its content or 'sense' within a system of
grammatical consequences as given by the theory of linguistic
meaning. But linguistic communication involves an experience of
what I am calling 'signilicant meaning' over and above linguistic (or
propositional) meaning. 'Significant' or intentional meaning is most
evident in cultural and acsthetic contcxts, and is not primarily
semantic. because it is, in Roger Scruton's phrase, 'immanent in an
expcriencc'-of hearing the music, of viewing the painting, of
2 Paul Ricocur, The Rule of MClaphor: Mulli-disciplinary siudies in Ihe crea/ion
of meaning in language. tr. Rohert Czerhy, Kathleen McLaughlin and John
Costcllo, London, 1978. p. 239.
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participating in thc ritual, of rcading a poem, of sharing a joke or
metaphor. 3 There could be no theory of what gestures, facial
expressions, rituals or works art mean or say .comparable to theories
of linguistic meaning, for these phenomena lack the requisite semantic
structure. Dcspite its analogy with linguistic meaning, 'significant
meaning' is not best modelled in terms of linguistic meaning, whether
that is explicated in tcrms of semantics, pragmatics, speakers'
intentions, speech acts, and so on.
The experience of significance in non-linguistic contexts can bc
seen to involve thc two most general features of any experience of
meaning noted above. Thus, for examplc, someone I fall in love with
stands out from all other people, and evokes my hopes and desires for
relationship. Similarly, when seeing one's national flag, it strikes one
as standing out from all other flags and evokcs attitudes, feelings and
thoughts (positive or negative), probably of onc's country, its people
and history. And again, in hearing the sadness in the music, my
attcntion is dircctcd beyond the music, which is itself irreducible to
physical sounds, to the sadness it expresses.
Morcover, it is crucial to notc that just as when a reader feels pity
for a character in a novel, so when hearing the sadness in thc music,
the object of the experience (the character, the sadness) is intentional.
it need havc no actual cxistencc. Indeed, an cxperiencc of significant
meaning nced involve no intentional object at all: thus. a facial
expression may bc highly exprcssive. exhibiting a particular and
evocative exprcssion, without thcrc being anything of which it is the
exprcssion."
'Signifkant meaning' is personally evocative because it concerns
what somcthing (or someonc) means to me, or means to someone. 5
This kind of mcaning is a mattcr of 'relevance': certain people, certain
works of art or fiction, particular rituals, gesturcs, and metaphors,
symbols, arc 'striking', 'touching', 'evocative' or 'imprcssivc' for
ccrtain people and not for others. Thc 'relevancc' one experiences will
be rcllected in behaviour and speech. and in the selection of, and
3 Cf. Roger Scruton. 'Analytic Philosuphy and the Meaning of Music', Journal
ojA('s(I/I~(ics and Art Criticism 45 (19H7): t 69. I have explored the relationship
hctwecll semantic meaning and significant meaning in my Ph.D. dissertatiun
nrc Signijicance oj Mcraphor: A SlIIdy oj Linguistic and Personal Meaning,
Katholicke Universiteit Lcuven. t9R9.
4 Scruton, p. 169.
5 Arnold 13urllls drew my attention to this characterization of 'relevant' meaning,
and this ;uliele derives largely from suggestions he first made.
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attachment to, some facts rather than others.
In the case of linguistic communication, the significant meaning
of an utterance does not abolish, but rather presupposes, prior levels
of meaningfulness; for instance, a declaration of forgiveness,
presupposes its semantic and pragmatic structure, but-as a
declaration offorgiveness-is not reducible to it. Its effectiveness as a
word of forgiveness turns on its being received as such by the
recipient. So the distinguishing feature of meaning as relevance is not
semantic disquotation (that an unerance S means that p), but rather the
way in which a phenomenon with a certain meaningfulness (e.g. the
literal meaning of an utterance, or the colour pattern of one's national
flag) comes to possess new relevance or particular significance for
someone. When experiencing significance one is taken 'beyond the
given', hence, for example, the transitions from understanding the
rules of a game to grasping its point. and perhaps wanting to play it.
from hearing sounds to hearing a variation on a musical theme. and
from understanding what an utterance (literally) says, to appreciating
its metaphorical point.
Metaphor as significant
This informal characterisation of the experience of significant meaning
may be clarified by considering the significance of metaphorical
speech, which will in turn introduce the significance of aesthetic
fiction. As I have argued elsewhere, the irreducibility of significant
meaning to linguistic meaning accords with Donald Davidson's
critique of cognitive theories of metaphor.6 Davidson, famously and
to many minds perversely, has argued that metaphors involve no
special cognitive meaning beyond what their words literally say and
mean. When we speak metaphorically, we use words and utterances
in order to achieve various effects. Those effects-prompting
comparisons, triggering images and moods, evoking emotions-are
flot explained by postulating special linguistic meanings (whether
semantic or pragmatic); the effects, rather, explain our temptation to
make such postulations. Just as a successful metaphor is not
explained by its possessing some special linguistic meaning, so, I will
argue, the value of fictional works is not to be explained by their
possessing special meaning or reference. Davidson's austere account
6 G. P. Gleeson, ''Ibe Linguistic and Personal Meaning of Metaphorical Speech',
Uleralure and Aeslhelics I (t 991): 60-81.
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of literal meaning opens the way for a deeper explanation of metaphor
in terms of its 'significance' for those speakers who find it appealing
and striking. What from Davidson's viewpoint' is' simply an 'effect' of
an utterance. can be more adequately portrayed in terms of the
experience of significance: a 'striking' utterance is valued by a speech
community in the way that symbols, emblems and totems are valued
as a focus of unity and common attachment. This is why, as David
Cooper has argued, the all pervasive, social function of metaphorical
speech is to 'cultivate the intimacy' of a speech community.?
Chief features of significance
The experience of significant meaning may be analysed in terms of
three aspects. First, although the experience is typically initiated by
another (by a speaker. author, artist), it is fundamentally passive: one
is stmck by the meaningful. by the symbol. the gesture, the tone of
voice. the face of another. the story, the music, etc. (Accordingly,
the experience is never entirely within one's control-it may cease to
he striking; one falls out of love, the impact of the music wanes, and
so on).
Secondly, despite this passivity, the experience evokes
reciprocity. Whatever initiates the experience (a symbol, an utterance,
a work of art) thereby evokes the need for a response which is both
faithful and striking in its turn: 'faithful', in as much as it manifests
recognition of the initiative,8 'striking', in that it is not merely a
recognition of the initiative. hut a response in its own right, with its
own evocation of significance. 'Responses' in this sense will include
declarations of forgiveness. gestures such as standing for the national
anthem, expressions of love, works of literary and artistic criticism,
and so on.
The 'response' will differ somewhat from the original utterance,
differ enough for it to be clear that the initiator of significance has
heen taken seriously and is receiving a significant (not a 'mechanical')
response. The response may well clarify the first utterance. or set it in
a new context; it will often be its requisite completion-the
7 David E. Cooper. Metaphor. Oxford. 1986.
X The idiom of 'making' confessions. declarations. etc. is suggestive of the point
I am arguing--that the significance of these utterances transcends the individual
speaker. he docs something which constitutes the realization (the 'making') of
something more than itself. and is not entirely within his contro!.
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acceptance of an apology, forgiveness after confession, and so on.
As a completing personal response it will never be mere repetition.
Moreover, the response is not something the initiator could make
entirely its own. Neutral information, e.g. the answer to a question, is
public property and could as well be uttered and passed on by its
recipient. The acceptance of an apology (or a work of literary
appreciation), however, remains tied to the respondent as Itis or Iter
faithful addition' to what initiated it. This structure of the 'faithful
addition' is of the essence of meaning as signiiicance. Accordingly.
the significant meaning of an utterance or gesture is not given by
some other sentence (as on the disquotational model: S means that p),
but is exhibited through a response, through 'uptake' which carries
the original significance further, and seeks response in its turn.
It follows that in 'personal speech' (and. indeed, in all speech in
so far as it involves this 'personal' aspect), one cannot know in
advance that a relationship will sustain the significance sought, or that
one's utterance will be received as embodying it. Personal speech
involves the risk of a speaker" identifying with 'what she says', an
utterance with an independent semantic content, context-free and as
such neither unique to the speaker, nor beyond contamination by
circumstanceS outside her control.
Furthermore, personal speech is not 'successful' because the
words uttered are adequate to the significance sought and found.
'Success' resides simply in speakers continuing to be struck by their
words, finding them apt. In their shared sensibility they 'are in touch
with each other'. Significance resides in mutual attachment to what
might just as easily not embody it.
Thirdly, therefore, significant meaning is inherently 'suspended'
or vulnerable, as it awaits the free response of an other, a faithful but
striking response which, like the initial utterance, is in turn exposed to
danger. This suspension cannot be avoided, for any definitive,
invulnerable response would be either no longer contingent on the
initial utterance, or wholly necessitated by it. If I will be forgiven no
matter what I say or do, I cease to matter; if my 'apology' is sure to
extract forgiveness, then 'forgiveness' is no longer what I receive.
Furthermore, the inherent vulnerability of signil1cance also
derives from the fact that it is always possible for us actively to take
distance from our experiences of significance, to reflect 'objectively'
on the fact that we are impressed by some utterance or gesture, by
some person or symbol, thereby loosening its captivation. We can
take steps to protect expressions of significance, for example by laws
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against blasphemy or against mistreating the national nag, yct thcse
stcps are themselves precarious, and in turn invoke a context of
significance.
This 'structural suspension' of significant meaning finds its
historical analogue in the vulnerability of personal existence to
separation, loss and death, and further takes the experience of
significant meaning beyond the comprehension of those involved.
There results a tcnsion not casily sustained: the tension bctween
wanting, yet being unable, to know what we mean to each other. The
meaning of human existence consists, it seems, in both living with the
suspension of significance, and living with our inability to live with it
(for an invulnerable attitude towards this suspension itself would be
no solution).9 Consequently, death has an ambivalent meaning for us.
It provides a ccrtain completion of personal meaning, rounding-off
one's life, making it a more comprehensible life, placed perhaps in 'a
conciliatory light' .10 Through death, especially a well-timed death,
one's life may acquire a pleasing wholeness. Nevertheless, evcn if
neithcr untimely nor painful, death only 'completes' the meaning of
an individual's life by also abolishing all further possibilities
of meaning for him or her. One's personal meaning becomes
comprehensible at the price of its abolition, despite any new
'wholeness' it acquires for those who survive and mourn. I I
It is this suspension or vulnerability of significant meaning which
is the key to understanding the value of works of art, and fiction in
particular. Art, I will argue, may be understood as a 'consoling
idealization' by which we are helped to live with the vulnerability of
significance.
Art as idealization of significance
I have identified various contexts in which we naturally speak of
9 'Ibis fonnulation. and IIlm:h of the preceding discussion. has hcen innuenced by
Paul Moyaert's lectures on Sartre and Lacan (Leuven. 1988-9).
10 Cf. Ludwig Willgenstein. Cullure and Value. ed. G. H von Wright. with
Heikki Nyman. tr. Peter Winch. Oxford, 1974. p.46. [Hereafter CVI Of course
there are also more complex questions whether events after one's death can alter
the meaning ofone's life
11 It follows that total human extinction would. in addition. make impossible any
completing transformation of personal significance through the mourning of
others. Jacques Derrida, I believe, has expressed such thoughts about the
consequences of nuclear holocaust.
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meaning as 'significance'. Because it is tied to the experience which
evokes it, significance defies exhaustive transparent description.
Yet, the connection with linguistic meaning is both inevitable and
appropriate, and it is in the light of the transparent paradigm of
semantic disquotation that significance is, by contrast, aptly described
as 'vulnerable', as lacking the wholeness of comprehensible
reciprocation, as defying definitive completion. This vulnerability is
essential: if ever the 'right words' could be found (as an expression
of one's love, as definitive literary criticism) significance would
be exhausted. Yet the experience of significance continues to seek
an adequate and complete reciprocation. We must sustain our
experiences of significance (Le. treat them as relatively invulnerable),
while yet recognising that their vulnerability is ineliminable. 12 Living
with this dilemma requires 'consolation' not elimination.
Consolation is sought in situations of Loss: it may promise the
restoration of what has been lost (I am consoled at the thought that
someone has found the wallet I misplaced), or may simply console
without promise of restoration (on the death of a loved one, I may be
consoled simply by the presence of a friend who has experienced the
same loss). In the latter case, we might speak of 'pure consolation',
unmixed with actual recompense or practical gain. Since this
vulnerability or absence of stability is inherent in significance, it
would seem that only a 'pure' consolation could appropriately
respond to it. Art (like religion), I will suggest, may be viewed as
'pure consolation'. 13
What then is 'consoling' about a work of art from the viewpoint
of significant meaning? Simply, that it may present itself to us as a
limited, though compLete whole, at once both striking and faithful. A
portrait, for instance, must be faithful to its subject-recognizably
a portrayal of someone-and yet strikingly expressive and
representational. A successful novel about life in Victorian England
will strike us as true to life (rather than fact), and yet be neither
predictable nor banal. The stylized dialogue of great drama is,
perhaps, the most obvious example of personal speech attaining its
ideal of reciprocal identifications. More generally, in so far as the
representational and expressi ve features of art works discipline our
12 The echoes here of Lacan will be evidcnt to thosc familiar with his work: we
must live with a situation with which we cannot live, and live with our
inability to live with it.
13 Though religious traditions which also promise 'eternal lifc' might bc said to
proffcr a 'mixed' consolation.
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imaginative response to them, we are delighted and consoled by the
recognisable fusion of form and content-of 'content' which has
found its 'strikingly faithful', formal embodiment, seemingly
'adequate' to its subject matter. Within the work, significance is no
longer suspended, no longer inherently unstable, as it is in personal
speech. Within the (limited) totality of the work, the significance of its
various details are constrained. The work is thus more resistant to
material and contextual contamination than is the personal speech of
actual life.
A work of art is, of course, a limited whole. Its fictionalization
ensures a circumscribing of details-by contrast to the indefinite array
of facts about actual lives. Its 'framing-off' as a limited whole
'condenses' its significance within itself, precluding innumerable
(possibly fantastic) connections with literal truth ('what was
Macbeth's birthday'?). The work of art always directs us back to the
details of the object itself. Within the experience of this limited whole
significance becomes, if only fleetingly. comprehensible to us; where
'real life' exacts death or the complete loss of meaning a<; the price for
our glimpses of wholeness. aesthetic experience offers an analogue
for the comprehension of significance exempt from that demand.
(TIlis notion of a limited whole recalls Wittgenstein's remark about
the 'mystical'.)
The inseparability of form and content, the incorporation of a
'faithful addition' within itself a<; a limited whole, and the relative
stability of its significance: when art is understood to invol ve these
features, it can be said to involve an 'idealization' of the personal
significance characteristic of human existence. Ted Cohen approaches
a similar thought from a different perspective. He remarks of jokes,
metaphors and works of art:
We find ourselves reflected in a surface which mirrors our dearest and
perhaps most human hope: to do well. but not under compulsion. 14
'To do well' -that is, to be faithful; 'not under compulsion'-that
is, with the striking freedom of a response which could not have been
manipulated or anticipated, and yet which is utterly appropriate. In
appreciating a great work of art, in engaging with its fictional world.
we perceive a kind of 'necessity' intrinsic to it-just these colours,
just that variation on the theme, this rhyme and rhythm, just
tllllt unfolding of plot and character. As Wittgenstcin remarks, we are
14 Ted Cohen, 'Jokes'. in cd. Eva Schaper. Plcasurc, Prcfercncc and Valuc
Cambridge. 1983, p. 136.
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tempted to locate this 'necessity' in some reality apart from the actual
work and to which it aims to correspond. When a musical theme, for
instance, seems to demand that a phrase be repeated if the work is to
realize its power, we can have the impression that in so doing the
theme is conforming to some real exemplar.
Yet there just is no paradigm apart from the theme itself. And yet
again there is a paradigm apart from the theme: namely, the rhythm
of our language. of our thinking and feeling. (ev, 52)
The necessities we discern in a work of art 'mirror' paradigms
within ourselves-'paradigms' of sensibility, language, practice.
relationship and significance-which constitute human existence. as
sigllijiclmtllnd illtefllionlll existence.
Aesthetically, the death of a style (whether of art or living) is
typically the result of its final and most perfect realization as a limited
whole. ls But human lives do not normally acquire this degree of
perfect stylization. If at times they begin to approach it, we become
rightly alarmed. Not surprisingly, in such instances we might resort
to aesthetic metaphors, to images of the well-ordered significance of
fiction. One of Chesterton's characters has the following experience
when approaching a large English country estate by night.
More pines. more pathway slid past him, and then he stood rooted as
by a blast of magic. It is vain to say that he felt as if he had got into
a dream: but this time he felt quite certain that he had got into a
book. For we human beings are used to inappropriate things; we arc
accustomed to the clatter of the incongruous; it is a tune to which
we can go to sleep. If one appropriate thing happens, it wakes us
like the pang of a perfect chord. Something happened such as would
have happened in such a place in a forgotten tale.
Over the black pinewood came nying and nashing in the moon a
naked sword ... (6
To think one 'has got into a book' is to find onc's actual life
taking on the planned significancc of an artistic work; it is to glimpse
one's life as a limited whole from a transcendental vantage-point. To
find one's lil'c reflected in 'a perfect chord' also evokes the 'pang',
the desolation of death which accompanies the perfection or
significance. At this point we are reminded of outstanding works of
biography. through which a person's life 'gets into a book'; the
15 It may also result from the loss or the contamination of the material
circumslances it presupposes.
16 G. K. Chesterton, 'The Strange Crime of John Doulnois', in Father Rrown-
Selected SlIIries. introd. Ronald Knox. London, IlJR7, p.227
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sclcction and circumscribing of dctails-clearly a kind of
fictionalization makes their life 'completc', a relatively
comprehensible. or 'significant', 'limited whole'.
Self-deception and aesthetic experience· .
What then is the value of art, with its fictional realization of
completed significance? Is it irrational self-delusion to take so
seriously the limited completions of aesthetic works? There is
obviously some self-deception involvcd in entertaining and allowing
oneself to be engaged by fictional thoughts, or in thinking that just
this biography expresses someone's life. If these thoughts were just
'quasi-beliefs', isolated from the rest of our lives, then, like
daydreams. fantasies and pri vate superstitions, they might be a
relatively harmless escape from some of the tensions of life. self-
indulgent deceptions providing emotional relaxation. No doubt some
fiction is approached in this way, and presumably some kinds of
fiction lend themselves to this attitude-chcap thrillers. Mills and
Boon romances, horror movies.
But clearly there is much more to great art, to significant fiction.
which disciplines our imaginative responses. Although an aesthetic
object seeks to realise the reciprocity of significance within itself, it
seeks in addition a response from those who attend to it: a response
that will in turn be 'faithful' but 'striking'. We can think here of some
of the masterpicccs of literary criticism. which themselves become
touchstones for further criticism. These responses acknowlcdge and
sustain the significance of the original.
Furthermore, great works of fiction are not isolated from real life;
they resist attempts at escapist exploitation. Some authors try to
explain this 'reality-connection' of great fiction in terms of the special
reference of works of fiction ('to the world of the text') or, in
Ricoeur's words. to our 'primordial belonging' to the world. My
proposal, by contrast. is that the link between fiction and life resides
in a certain kind of self-deception that is common to both.
We have seen how the structure of significant meaning which
constitutes personal existence ensures that speakers can nevcr fully
grasp. or control. their significance for each other. Experiences of
significance involve a certain passivity. a 'being-struck-by', precisely
because they are not within the intentional control of subjects.
Furthermore. every expreSSion of significance is inherently
precarious-changes in material circumstances or in perspective may
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evacuate the 'striking significance' of an utterance or gesture. There
can be no guarantee that one will continue to be struck by it.
The experience of significance involves a ba~ic self-deception, for
while we continue to find something significant we (necessarily)
overlook its possible loss of significance. Consequently, one aspect
of the 'idealization' of significant meaning that we inevitably postulate
is that it be free from the possibility of contamination or loss of
significance. In reflecting on these changes in significance for us,
we envision the need for an 'external model', an absolute and
non-contingent guarantee of significance, an 'impartial observer',
perhaps, for whom the true, unchanging significance of persons
and things is known. For this observer, significance could never
be lost or contaminated. However. this idealization conflicts
with the 'suspension' of significance explained previously. The
'transcendental truth' is that there is no ulti mate. pri vileged
viewpoint-what is striking (significant) from one viewpoint is not
from another. That is to say. every viewpoint is deceptive in as
much as (while captivating) it strikes us definitive and non-deceptive.
The question arises of how we are to relate to this precariously
shifting, 'suspended', realm of significance. To try to relate to it
'directly' would require us, either to explicitly declare all significance
deceptive, thereby leaving us with a 'god's-eye', but 'neutral' and
non-significant view of personal existence; or, if our relation to
significance is to remain evocative, to maintain the illusion by simply
adopting yet another unstable, and deceptive, view of it.
A more satisfactory, 'indirect'. approach to the shifting of
significance would try to combine the experience of significance with
a recognition of its instability and 'suspension'. Some of Heidegger's
late remarks on poetic language adumbrate the 'indirect' approach. 17
He located the truthfulness of poetic language (e.g. of HtHderlin's
lines about words as 'tlowers') in the fact that it discloses that it is
disclosure. as opposed to technological language, for example, which
conceals the fact that it presents the mystery of Being in only one of
the ways in which it can be revealed. For Hcidegger, every disclosure
of Being is also a concealment. Heidegger's remarks about Being can
be applied to what is here called significance: every experience of
significance. while it lasts, conceals the possibilities of different
significance (every rude word may become ridiculous; every sacred
17 Cf. Cooper. pp. 251-7. with reference to Martin Heideggcr. On Ihe Way 10
Language. tr. Peter D. Hert7.. Harper & Row, 1971.
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symbol may become profane or secular, every poem may become
'unreadable', every melody contaminated by its use in a cigarette
advertisement).
The 'Heideggerian' suggestion is that poetic language discloses
Being, and discloses that its words are disclosive (and thereby
concealing as well). Similarly, the fictionalization of works of art
embodies significance, while also embodying an explicit recognition
that this significance is fictional (an illusion). Fiction can thus remind
us that all experiences of significance are unstable, and-in so far as
they conceal this-deceptive, but it does so in and through an
experience of significance (of the work of art as a limited whole).
Recognition of the fiction involved is crucial to aesthetic experience;
to this extent, 'reality' intrudes upon us. To mistake the portrait for its
subject, or mistake fiction for historical narrative, is to misunderstand
the work. In understanding that we are reading fiction, we at the same
time recognize its deceptive character, like the deceptive character of
all experiences of significance.
To ensure this recognition occurs, a novelist will often heighten
the tension with reality by trying to destroy her fiction-implying the
events actually occurred, or that the heroine died shortly after the
novel was written, or by referring in the story to historical persons
and events, or by imposing her own remarks as author, rather than
fictional narrator, or by providing two endings to a novel, and so on.
These effects set up a tension between the fictional and the real.
Because reality intrudes the reader may become unsure what is
fiction, what is fact. But the author's aim is not deception or
confusion for its own sake. She gives the reader glimpses of actual
life taking on a comprehensible significance ('getting into a book'),
but a significance whose instability is all too apparent precisely
because the reader knows it is fictional. In so far as the novelist
reveals her own hand in the fiction she is creating, the reader may
have a sense of disillusionment-'it's only a story', whereas he had
hoped, if only for a time, that the significance embodied in the fiction
might be realized in life (that 'life could be like this'). Yet, it is the
lucid, non-delusory self-deception of fiction which separates it from
the private, secret self-deceptions of fantasy and day-dreaming. These
latter cannot survive the lucidity which good fiction encourages, even
as it delights and disciplines our imaginative involvement with a
work.
The value of fiction is, accordingly. that it provides one important
way of allowing the self-deception that significant· meaning makes
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unavoidable to come indirectly. but lucidly. before our
consciousness. It thus provides a 'revelation', not of a new reality,
but of our inescapable relationship to the vulnerable and 'suspended'
significance of all reality, Moreover, it does so from within an
experience of significance-of aesthetic meaning, re- presentation and
expression which is itself vulnerahle and 'suspended'. It is not
derogatory to describe a fiction's significance as consoling, for it
clearly remains a 'suspended' consolation. It would not be 'more
rational' to abandon the consolations of fictio~ since to do so would
prcsuppose the fixed 'invulnerable' attitude towards significance
which, as notcd above, constitutes its death. The valuc of aesthetic
fiction is that it both enhances our experience of significance while yet
preserving the significance of our relationship to it. In short, as one
critic remarks in the light of Auden's poem 'The Truest Poetry is the
Most Feigning':
Art acknowledges man's lying nature by at least lying opellly and
insisting on il~ own artificiality, playfulness and exaggcration. 1R
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